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The immediate crisis of illegal immigration across the English Channel is real and urgent. Restore Britain is responding to it as such.
Britain cannot expect to remain safe in our own homeland if we continue as we are now, without the permanent maritime surveillance, patrol, and law-enforcement capability necessary to secure our maritime borders.
That is why we are now publishing Restoring Britain's Maritime Domain.
The Coastal Command we will create is not simply a response to the small-boats crisis. It will counter the full spectrum of threats and risks to our maritime borders, of which illegal immigration is one. However, given the seriousness and urgency of the crisis we face from illegal immigration, addressing it will be an immediate priority of the Command.
We are a maritime nation. We must establish and maintain a permanent presence in our seas and know, in real time, what is happening in them and in the approaches to them.
The task extends beyond countering illegal immigration. It includes combatting all forms of transnational organised crime and smuggling, protecting our fisheries, sanctions enforcement, search and rescue missions, pollution control, the protection of critical national maritime infrastructure, and working with the Royal Navy to secure the nation against the activities of hostile actors.
At present, those tasks are fragmented across government departments, agencies, and commercial contracts. The system is inefficient, expensive, and fails to utilise the capabilities we have in the best way. The existing system is unfit for purpose.
All too often, politicians seek an easy answer and look to the Royal Navy.
That is the wrong answer.
The Royal Navy exists principally to deter military aggression and to defend the United Kingdom and its interests against military threats. It is already heavily committed and should not be routinely drawn away from its deterrent and defence responsibilities to compensate for the absence of an adequate civilian maritime law-enforcement capability.
Coastal Command provides that capability and leaves the Royal Navy to do what it is designed to do and does best.
Coastal Command will also provide one of the most essential operational building blocks required to stop the boats.
Another essential requirement is to create sufficient secure detention capacity to ensure that all illegal arrivals can be held securely, away from the public, until they are removed. The details of Restore Britain's solution to this will be published separately.
It is also important to note that our forthcoming National Security Strategy will establish the framework within which border security sits. Beneath the National Security Strategy, Restore Britain will develop an Integrated Border Security and Management Strategy for securing and managing the United Kingdom's land, air, and maritime borders properly, bringing coherence to the plans and activities of government departments, law-enforcement and intelligence agencies, border organisations and other relevant bodies at local, national and international levels to ensure British Borders are properly secured against the full spectrum of risks, including illegal immigration.
Restore Britain will establish UK Borders & Coastal Command as a new, unified, national border-security organisation with the law-enforcement powers and operational capability required to surveil, protect, and secure the United Kingdom's land, air, and maritime borders while facilitating the safe and expeditious movement of legitimate passengers and goods.
UK Borders & Coastal Command will comprise two branches. A reformed Border Force will retain responsibility principally for the land and air domains and the land-side border function along the coastline and at maritime ports of entry - the minor reforms to Border Force will be dealt with separately - and a new Coastal Command. Coastal Command will assume responsibility for the maritime domain: the United Kingdom's maritime borders, Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone.
Coastal Command will bring together maritime surveillance, patrol, interception, law enforcement, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response, and related maritime operations into one permanent, integrated service. In peacetime, it will operate through the Home Office; in war or a defined national-defence emergency, designated Coastal Command capability will transfer under Royal Navy Operational Control and contribute to the maritime defence of the United Kingdom coastline and littoral waters. It will be trained and equipped for both roles.
Britain's maritime security is presently fragmented across departments, agencies, contracts, and devolved bodies. Substantial assets exist, but they answer to different mandates, budgets, and cultures. The establishment of Coastal Command would bring an end to that incoherence. It creates one Maritime Operating Picture, one command architecture, and one multi-role force of vessels, aircraft, uncrewed systems, and specialist teams that can be tasked by operational need as opposed to departmental ownership.
Harbour masters will become statutory partners in recording and reconciling vessel movements. Policy and regulation will stay with specialist authorities. Operational enforcement at sea will move to Coastal Command. Personnel will hold the Office of Constable. High-risk intervention will be provided by a dedicated Maritime Intervention Group so that peacetime enforcement does not depend upon the Royal Navy.
The service will be built in stages: baseline assessment in six months, Initial Operating Capability at about 18 months, and Full Operating Capability by year four, with a planned establishment of some 5,000 paid personnel plus the existing volunteer rescue network.
Existing maritime spending will transfer with the assets; net additional running costs upon the accomplishment of full capability are estimated at around £0.9-1.0 billion a year. Our reward will be a permanent civilian maritime law-enforcement capability that can secure the nation's waters in peacetime and stand available, already deployed around the coast, to reinforce the Royal Navy in war.
This paper lays out Restore Britain's plan for the establishment of a Coastal Command.
The Mission of Coastal Command will be:
' To secure the United Kingdom's maritime borders, enforce UK law within maritime jurisdiction and, in cooperation with the armed forces and other agencies, support the defence of the nation and its critical national infrastructure. '
Coastal Command will form one branch of a new UK Borders and Coastal Command - the other being a slightly reformed Border Force retaining its present non-maritime functions.
This paper focuses on the establishment of Coastal Command.
Coastal Command will consolidate all of our maritime surveillance, patrolling, enforcement, and rescue capabilities within one organisation, thereby creating unity of purpose, unity of effort, mutual support, and enhancing the efficient use of available resources and the effectiveness of border security.
Coastal Command will be responsible for maintaining the Maritime Operating Picture combining surveillance, intelligence, port and harbour authorities, maritime patrols, aircraft, uncrewed systems, and other national security information to provide the real-time situational awareness necessary to support rapid risk assessments and operational decision making.
Patrol vessels and aircraft will no longer be tasked according to departmental mandates, but will move between taskings as directed by Coastal Command according to operational requirements and priorities.
Harbour Masters will become an intrinsic part of the reporting system and will connect observed movement at sea with declared movement into and out of port.
Regulatory and specialist authorities will retain their professional, specialist responsibilities while operational monitoring and enforcement will be conducted by one operational maritime service.
In peacetime, 'Restoring Britain's Maritime Domain' will give the United Kingdom a permanent civilian law enforcement capability able to surveil, secure, and properly manage the nation's maritime borders and waters across the full spectrum of threats and responsibilities without having to rely on the Military. This includes the interception and seizure of non-compliant vessels, the securing and control of ships subject to lawful sanctions or other enforcement action, counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking operations, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, intervention aboard vessels where armed resistance is possible, and other operations requiring specialist maritime boarding and tactical skills.
In wartime, it will provide the Royal Navy with an inter-operable, suitably trained and equipped maritime force already well-situated around the United Kingdom and able at short notice to contribute to coastal defence, maritime interdiction, protection of critical infrastructure, and the wider defence of the nation.
We must cease the habit of conflating borders with immigration.
Nonetheless, the flow of illegal migration across the English Channel constitutes a significant threat to the United Kingdom and the safety of the public, is a matter of grave concern to the public and ending it is a priority of Restore Britain. It goes without saying, then, that immigration enforcement would be one of the major duties of UK Borders & Coastal Command. But as set out in our Mass Deportations (2025) paper, the best way to remove the illegal immigrant population is to create a hostile environment against illegals within the British mainland, backed by an unapologetic system of forced detention and swift deportation.1 This would also establish a credible deterrent that causes the number of attempted illegal crossings to approach zero. As far as illegal immigration is concerned, we therefore anticipate a less demanding workload in the English Channel under a Restore Britain government. Needless to say, though, Borders and Coastal Command would remain duty-bound to intercept, detain, and facilitate via Immigration Enforcement the timely removal of anyone who chooses to waste their money paying smugglers to traffick them across our waters despite the restrictive conditions we would impose.
The borders of the United Kingdom face a broad spectrum of risks and threats against which the state must protect and secure the nation and to address them requires surveillance of the approaches to the border, the border itself, and the relevant hinterland.
The risks and threats that emanate from outside the United Kingdom's borders evolve over time, so the national response must identify, assess, and adapt accordingly. Those risks and threats include illegal immigration, drugs and firearms trafficking, organised smuggling and trafficking, the movement of endangered species and historical artefacts, public health-related and phytosanitary risks, illicit, counterfeit, and dangerous goods, pollution, hostile activity on the part of foreign states or their proxies, terrorism, sanctions evasion, illegal fishing, and threats to critical national infrastructure.
The maritime domain calls for further permanent responsibilities. It is a dangerous operating environment in which the state must be able to preserve life at sea, detect and respond to marine pollution, protect fisheries, monitor and protect ports and offshore infrastructure, and respond to activity affecting undersea cables, pipelines, electricity interconnectors, offshore energy installations, and other critical maritime infrastructure.
The duty of operationally addressing these risks, threats, and responsibilities will fall to Coastal Command.
Restore Britain's wider National Security Strategy (NSS) - to be published in due course - identifies what the United Kingdom must preserve, protect, secure, and defend, as well as the posture, capabilities, and structures required to do so. The NSS will in turn direct and frame a nationwide Border Security and Management Strategy (BSMS) that integrates all aspects of our border security and management in the land, air, and maritime domains and at the local, national, and international levels, so that the various activities on our borders are treated as one integrated national system rather than as a series of unrelated departmental responsibilities.
Coastal Command will become the principal operational arm of our maritime border security.
Britain's maritime border-security and management problems are primarily structural and architectural, but also stem from a wayward culture within the very institutions tasked with addressing them.
The operating environment is one maritime space, but the state's response to it is incoherent, lacking in integration and siloed by departmental reporting chains.
Responsibilities are divided between numerous government departments, public agencies, devolved administrations, local authorities, and commercial contracts, each with its own statutory basis, chain of command, budget, priorities, personnel structures, equipment, information systems, and operating culture.
Within the Home Office, Border Force Maritime, together with maritime arrangements associated with Border Security Command, presently provide the principal dedicated civil maritime law enforcement vessel capability.
The force operates cutters, Coastal Patrol Vessels, Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), and Tactical Water Craft, supported by a variety of maintenance, engineering, and commercially provided arrangements.
The Home Office has initiated the Maritime Capability Replacement Programme to replace the ageing cutter and coastal patrol capability. Restore Britain would halt that programme in order to allow for vessel design to be aligned with the tasks and roles set out in this paper.
HM Coastguard presently maintains the national maritime and aeronautical search-and-rescue coordination system through its Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre.
HM Coastguard also maintains the Coastguard Rescue Service, a distributed network of approximately 3,500 Coastguard Rescue Officers. Under our policy, that network will transfer into Coastal Command as the Coastal Command Rescue Officer Network, retaining its coastal and shore-based rescue role.
Much of the associated aviation is delivered under the second generation UK Search and Rescue (UKSAR2G) contract with Bristow Helicopters. This includes provision of 18 helicopters, six King Air fixed-wing aircraft, and deployable unmanned aircraft capability, all operated by civilian contractors.
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency separately maintains the government's principal counter-pollution capability, including national stocks of specialist equipment, including aircraft equipped for maritime pollution surveillance, detection, and aerial dispersant operations.
These aircraft possess surveillance capabilities that are valuable far beyond the narrow role in which they are presently employed.
In England, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) owns the principal fisheries protection policy framework.
However, the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) is responsible for conducting offshore enforcement using its own enforcement officers, vessel-monitoring systems, and an outsourced contracted patrol capacity.
Then there are ten Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, each of which maintain their own local enforcement personnel and patrol craft.
Scotland operates the Marine Protection Vessels Minna, Jura, and Hirta, high-speed inshore craft, and shipborne remotely piloted aircraft. The Welsh government operates Rhodri Morgan, Lady Megan, Catrin, Gwenllian, and Siwan. Northern Ireland's DAERA operates Banrion Uladh and fast-response craft.
The Royal Navy's Batch 1 River-class Offshore Patrol Vessels provide further patrol capacity.
The Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) already fuses data to form an important part of the national maritime information picture and draws personnel and information from civilian, military, intelligence, and law-enforcement bodies.
Ports and harbour authorities hold further information through local vessel-movement systems; CERS3 receives prescribed commercial-shipping information; Border Force and HMRC receive international pleasure-craft reports; and Customs, fisheries, immigration, and other authorities hold additional data relevant to the same maritime activity.
The result of all this is that we possess substantial capability without a single operational system able to mobilise it to full effect.
Surveillance, patrol, interception, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response, harbour reporting, and maritime law enforcement are all directed through different chains of command and different institutional priorities. Information may be relevant to several missions at once, yet the organisations holding it and the assets capable of acting upon it remain divided.
One can imagine the consequences of policing a city by establishing different specialist police forces, each answering to a different department, operating from different police stations, using different communications, and tasked only within a specific and narrow remit. That is effectively how we approach our maritime border: reasonably well-resourced, but otherwise incoherent, expensive, and ineffective.
Restore Britain will replace this existing, fragmented, and inefficient system with one coherent maritime operating system.
Coastal Command will be devoted to securing and managing the UK's maritime borders and the capabilities required to deliver that mission, rather than around the historical departmental ownership of individual tasks or assets.
Patrol vessels will be Coastal Command patrol vessels capable by their initial and evolving design, equipment, and crew training of surveillance, patrolling, deterrence, interception, boarding, law enforcement, rescue, and other maritime-security tasks.
Coastal Command will consolidate all maritime-surveillance aircraft, and instead of being narrowly tasked, they will be capable of and tasked with the broad range of tasks required on our maritime borders and in our maritime jurisdiction: detecting and identifying vessels, supporting border and counter-smuggling operations, deterring and interdicting illegal immigration, monitoring fisheries and critical infrastructure, assisting search and rescue, detecting marine pollution, and the like.
The concept is that every platform - vessel, aircraft, uncrewed system, coastal sensor, harbour report, and operational log system - will contribute to the same common Maritime Operating Picture (MOP).
Coastal Command will be organised into National and Sector areas and HQs. The commanders and staff of those HQs will use that MOP to assess what is happening, decide upon the appropriate response, and task the most suitable available capability, reinforcing that response with nationally held specialist resources as necessary.
Dedicated search-and-rescue, specialist pollution response, high-risk maritime intervention, complex investigation, and other specialist tasks will retain the equipment and expertise they require, but will work through the common command, information, and operating architecture of Coastal Command.
The purpose is therefore, firstly, to turn the maritime capabilities already funded by the state into one coherent, multi-role operational capability and, then, to strengthen that capability by providing resources designed to meet the needs of Coastal Command's mission and operating environment.
The principles on which Coastal Command will be established are:
Coastal Command will consolidate all existing maritime surveillance, enforcement, security, and rescue capabilities within one Command architecture as the maritime branch of the new UK Border & Coastal Command. It will surveil, patrol, and monitor our maritime borders, approaches to them, and the waters within them. Coastal Command will maintain a continuous MOP. In wartime or time of heightened military threat, it will be ready and able to move under Royal Navy Operational Control (OPCON) to assist in securing British waters and maritime infrastructure.
At the centre of Coastal Command's concept of operations will be the MOP: The MOP will be Coastal Command's continuously maintained representation and assessment of activity across the United Kingdom's maritime domain and approaches. It will provide the common operational information environment from which National commanders, Sector commanders, intelligence staff, vessels, aircraft, and specialist units work.
Its starting requirement will be to create situational awareness. Coastal Command will seek the fullest practicable picture of maritime activity to enable the significance of every incident, event, occurrence and contact to be assessed and understood.
A vessel that appears routine at one point may acquire importance following a change of course, new intelligence, interaction with another vessel, a discrepancy in its declared movement, a change of identity or unusual activity near critical infrastructure.
For each contact, the system will seek to establish position and movement, vessel type, identity and registration, present flag, owner and operator, responsible master, origin, intended destination, voyage history, declared activity, cargo and persons aboard where relevant, fisheries status, sanctions status, intelligence associations, and observed behaviour. This will allow commanders to distinguish a positively identified and compliant vessel from one whose identity, activity or characteristics cannot be ascertained, are suspicious, or indicate a risk, requiring a response.
The MOP will draw continuously, in real time, on coastal radar, AIS, satellite surveillance, fisheries Vessel Monitoring Systems and inshore monitoring, Coastal Command vessels and aircraft, uncrewed aerial and maritime systems, electro-optical and infrared sensors, port and harbour reporting, Customs and border information, commercial maritime data, infrastructure operators, police, the National Crime Agency, intelligence agencies, Defence, and authorised international partners.
Every operational platform will both draw from and contribute to that picture. A Coastal Command aircraft may detect a vessel and provide radar, optical, and infrared information. A patrol vessel may establish visual identity and conduct a boarding. The boarding may reveal information concerning the crew, cargo, documentation, ownership or voyage. A harbour master may subsequently record the vessel's arrival and expose a discrepancy between its declared and actual movement. The information obtained throughout that sequence will return to the MOP and the wider intelligence system.
The operating cycle will therefore be continuous: detect, identify, correlate, classify, assess, track, decide, task, act, exploit, and reassess.
The MOP will be designed to feed directly into the Royal Navy's maritime command-and-control architecture and contribute to the Naval Recognised Maritime Picture and wider joint operational picture.
National direction will be exercised through a National Maritime Operations Centre (NMOC), built principally from the capability that already exists within JMSC.
The NMOC will maintain the national Maritime Operating Picture, set surveillance priorities, direct nationally held Coastal Command assets, coordinate operations extending across Sector boundaries and provide the principal maritime operational interface with Defence, the intelligence agencies, NCA, HMRC, Counter Terrorism Policing, and other national partners.
Border Force maritime tasking will move into the NMOC.
HM Coastguard's Joint Rescue Coordination Centre will become the specialist national rescue component of the same architecture.
The multi-agency intelligence relationships already developed through JMSC will remain integral to the system, giving Coastal Command direct access to the information required to assess maritime activity in its national-security context.
Operational control close to any incident will sit with geographically based Coastal Command Sectors and will be based on the Bronze, Silver, and Gold command levels that exist within the emergency services.
A National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment will determine the Coastal Command Sector Areas of Operation and boundaries by analysing, among other things:
Vulnerabilities in relation to those things identified by the NSS as requiring protection, security, and defence.
Shipping density.
Commercial and fishing ports, marinas, and pleasure craft.
Fisheries.
Offshore energy.
Critical infrastructure, including undersea cables, pipelines, and interconnectors.
Criminal activities.
Migration routes.
Search-and-rescue demand.
Pollution risk, weather.
Sea state, distances.
Operating bases and distances.
Aviation access.
Engineering support.
Defence requirements.
However, the initial planning assumptions require the following Sector Commands: Channel Sector, Southern North Sea Sector, Northern North Sea Sector, Western Approaches Sector, Irish Sea Sector, and North Atlantic Sector.
The different maritime environments will produce different force requirements.
The English Channel requires dense surveillance, rapid interception, rescue readiness, and safe operation within exceptionally heavy commercial traffic. The Western Approaches require endurance, range, and seakeeping. The North Sea combines dense commercial traffic, fisheries, offshore energy, and extensive critical seabed infrastructure. The Irish Sea combines international movements, major ports, fisheries, and energy infrastructure within a more confined operating environment.
Each Sector will possess an appropriate mix of routine patrol vessels, interception craft, surveillance capability, boarding personnel and support, and will maintain the working relationship with ports, harbour authorities, police, emergency services, fisheries administrations, and critical-infrastructure operators within the Sector.
Nationally held capabilities - long-range surveillance, the Maritime Intervention Group, major pollution response, afloat command capability and other scarce resources - will reinforce the Sectors according to operational need.
This command architecture will allow the same asset to move naturally between missions. For example, a Coastal Command patrol vessel may deploy into its Sector on a general patrolling task monitoring commercial traffic and fishing activity, receive a task to identify a contact whose observed movement conflicts with its declared voyage, become the nearest suitable unit to a distress call, and later support a specialist boarding. In such a scenario, much as a police patrol on land would, the vessel remains the same operational asset throughout. The mission and tasking changes, but the command relationships do not.
The aviation assets will work in the same way. For example, a Coastal Command fixed-wing surveillance aircraft may be tasked to conduct general surveillance in a given area. Its sensors may detect unlawful fishing, it may be re-tasked to locate a vessel in distress, and during that task it may detect marine pollution. The aircraft task is maritime surveillance; the operational problem revealed by that surveillance determines the response.
Search-and-rescue helicopters will retain the readiness required for rescue while operating within the same information and command architecture and uncrewed aircraft will provide persistent coverage, track continuity, and additional surveillance where their endurance and sensor performance provide operational advantage.
Coastal Command will calculate force structure from the operational capability required on task. Each Sector and each nationally held specialist capability will receive a Minimum Operational Availability Requirement defining the vessels, aircraft, crews, specialist teams, and response times that must be available for tasking.
The physical establishment will then be calculated to sustain that requirement through maintenance, refit, defects, crew rest, leave, sickness, mandatory training, continuation training, and periods of surge. A requirement for one offshore patrol vessel continuously available may therefore require more than one physical hull and more than one crew. Aviation, intervention teams, rescue coordination, and pollution capability will be calculated by the same method.
National engineering planners will work with operational HQs to ensure that the withdrawal of assets for maintenance and refits does not disrupt operational coverage. Crew establishments will support sustainable watchkeeping, leave, and training. Reserve capability will support surge and national reinforcement. Operational capability will therefore be measured principally in available operational effect rather than nominal inventory totals.
Coastal Command will possess its own armed maritime specialist intervention capability for the most demanding law enforcement and national security operations at sea.
The Maritime Intervention Group (MIG) will be a permanent, nationally held formation within Coastal Command, available at high readiness for deployment in support of any Sector. It will provide the capability required where the risk, complexity or degree of resistance exceeds that appropriate to a normal Coastal Command boarding team. It will have three dedicated medium intervention helicopters and specialist surface transport for national deployment.
Its personnel will be armed and selected, trained and equipped for high-risk maritime intervention.
Their duties will include the interception and seizure of non-compliant vessels, the securing and control of ships subject to lawful sanctions or other enforcement action, counter-terrorism and counter-trafficking operations, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, intervention aboard vessels where armed resistance is possible, and other operations requiring specialist maritime tactical skills.
The MIG will train and exercise alongside Counter Terrorism Policing, the National Crime Agency, specialist police firearms units, the Royal Marines, and UK Special Forces, enabling additional capability to be assembled quickly when the threat or complexity requires it.
The MIG has no shortage of international equivalents. The United States Coast Guard employs Maritime Security Response Teams and Tactical Law Enforcement Teams for high-risk law enforcement, counter-terrorism, maritime interdiction, and defence-support tasks, and in 2026 began consolidating its deployable specialist forces under a Special Missions Command. Finland's Border Guard maintains professional special-intervention units, including the 5th Special Intervention Unit within the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard District, and exercises them at sea with police and military special forces.
For maritime security and enforcement operations below the threshold at which the Ministry of Defence assumes responsibility for a military operation, Coastal Command will be the lead operational authority and the supported command. The Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and other Defence capabilities will act in support where military assets are required.
This relationship will apply particularly to complex sanctions enforcement, major counter-smuggling operations, hostile or proxy-state activity below armed conflict, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, and other incidents in which the principal purpose remains enforcement, security or protection within our own national jurisdiction. The commander responsible for the operation will determine the effect required and request supporting capability accordingly. The Royal Navy may provide a warship, specialist sensors, force protection, explosive-ordnance expertise or military personnel. The Royal Air Force may provide maritime-patrol aircraft, additional surveillance, air mobility or other air support. Intelligence agencies, NCA, police, HMRC, FCDO, and technical authorities will provide their specialist components.
A major sanctions seizure illustrates the model. The MOP may first identify the vessel through sanctions information, ownership, flag history, voyage behaviour or intelligence. Coastal Command surveillance assets can establish and maintain contact while the NMOC assembles the legal, intelligence, and operational assessment. The relevant Sector commander can position surface and aviation capability. Where the seizure requires armed intervention, the MIG will provide the principal Coastal Command boarding force. A suitable Coastal Command vessel may act as the afloat command platform, carrying the operational commander, MIG command element, investigators, legal or sanctions specialists and other personnel required. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force support can be added according to the assessed threat while Coastal Command retains command of the operation.
The same relationship will apply to suspicious hostile-state activity around critical maritime infrastructure. Coastal Command will lead surveillance, investigation, and civil intervention while the activity remains a maritime-security and law-enforcement matter. Defence assets can reinforce that operation. Where the government determines that the situation has become a military operation or an armed attack, the national command relationship will move accordingly.
Coastal Command will also develop an afloat command capability for major incidents. Selected vessels will possess enhanced secure communications, working space, information systems, additional accommodation, and facilities sufficient for an embarked Coastal Command commander and multi-agency staff to direct sustained activity at sea while remaining connected to the NMOC. The same command capability may coordinate a major sanctions seizure, a mass-rescue incident, a complex pollution emergency or a prolonged security operation around maritime infrastructure.
The MOP must connect movement at sea with the points at which vessels, crews, passengers, and goods enter or leave the United Kingdom.
Restore Britain will place a clear statutory responsibility upon harbour authorities and harbour masters for recording, reconciling, and reporting maritime movement within their jurisdiction. Every designated harbour, commercial port, fishing port, marina or other authorised maritime point of arrival and departure will form part of the national maritime border system and therefore the MOP.
Harbor Masters will have a statutory duty placed upon them to ensure every arrival from sea and every departure to sea through a designated port or harbour is recorded and reported. International maritime arrivals and departures will be subject to the full national reporting requirement. Routine movement between berths, anchorages, and moorings within the same harbour will remain within the harbour's normal traffic-management record unless an additional security or operational requirement applies.
For international movement, the master, skipper, owner or agent will be legally required to provide the prescribed information before arrival or departure within the period established for the relevant class of vessel and voyage. The harbour authority, acting through the harbour master, will ensure that the movement is recorded and that the prescribed information enters the Borders & Coastal Command reporting system.
The record will establish, according to vessel and voyage type, the identity and registration of the vessel, its owner and operator, the responsible master or skipper, the port or place from which it has arrived, its declared destination, the time and point of arrival or departure, its berth, anchorage or landing place, crew and passenger details or the appropriate statutory declaration reference, relevant cargo and Customs declaration information, and crew changes associated with the voyage.
Existing systems including CERS3, Customs declarations, pleasure-craft reporting, and established port-management systems will feed the national architecture and MOP electronically. Larger ports will transmit directly from their operating systems. Smaller harbours and marinas will use a proportionate national reporting interface.
Harbour masters will reconcile actual movements against the declarations held by the system. An international vessel expected but never arriving, a vessel arriving from abroad without a declaration, an unexplained crew change, an unauthorised embarkation or disembarkation, undeclared loading or unloading, apparent false documentation or a material divergence from the declared voyage will generate a report to the appropriate Coastal Command Sector. Harbour authorities will carry a positive statutory duty to report such discrepancies and suspicious or unexplained maritime activity without delay.
The master or operator of a vessel will carry legal responsibility for providing accurate information. Knowingly providing false information, deliberately evading a designated international reporting location or intentionally failing to make a required declaration will attract statutory penalties proportionate to the seriousness of the offence.
Coastal Command will maintain the national reporting architecture, audit compliance, and connect harbour information directly to the MOP. The operating principle will be clear: all international maritime movement must be declared, all arrivals from and departures to sea must be recorded, and declared movement must correspond with observed movement.
Harbour masters will remain within their existing statutory harbour organisations and continue to exercise responsibility for navigation, harbour safety, pilotage, berthing, and local vessel movement. They will become statutory maritime border partners with a defined recording, reconciliation, reporting, and cooperation role.
Coastal Command will provide the common operational maritime capability through which government departments and regulatory authorities enforce their requirements at sea.
Subject-matter authorities will retain the policy, regulatory, scientific, and specialist professional responsibilities belonging to them.
Defra and the competent fisheries administrations will determine fisheries policy, quotas, licensing, conservation measures, and technical regulation.
Environmental authorities will determine environmental policy and scientific standards.
HMRC will retain Customs and revenue policy and specialist investigation.
Public-health and phytosanitary authorities will retain their professional decision-making and inspection functions.
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency will retain independent vessel-safety regulation, ship and seafarer certification, and technical maritime standards.
The police, National Criminal Intelligence Service (to be re-established under a Restore Britain government), and the National Crime Agency will retain their sets of responsibilities.2
Maritime command, navigation, and operational execution will be moved within the Coastal Command chain of command.
This allows a department such as Defra to specify the fisheries enforcement requirement while Coastal Command determines how maritime resources are deployed to deliver it. For instance, a general-purpose patrol vessel can enforce fisheries rules during one part of a patrol and respond to another maritime priority later in the same deployment. The same principle applies to Customs, pollution, public health, and other statutory responsibilities.
Restore Britain will consolidate the existing non-military maritime capabilities of the state, integrate them into one operating system, and then enhance that system until it delivers the level of maritime border security required by the BSMS and NSS. The mission will drive every transfer, organisational decision, and investment.
From the mission flow the tasks that Coastal Command must deliver: maintaining the MOP, maritime surveillance and identification, patrol and presence, interception and boarding,counter-smuggling and border enforcement, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, pollution detection and response, sanctions enforcement, protection of critical maritime infrastructure, armed specialist intervention, and support to national defence.
During the first six months of government, a full-time Programme Director, accountable through a Senior Responsible Owner, will establish the authoritative baseline from which Coastal Command will be built.
The National Borders Coordinator, to be established under the forthcoming Restore Britain NSS, will provide the strategic border requirement through the BSMS, and the Programme Director will translate that requirement into the organisation, capability, and transition programme.
A joint transition headquarters will draw experienced personnel from the Home Office, Border Force and Border Security Command, DfT and the MCA, Defra, and the MMO, JMSC, HM Treasury, Cabinet Office, and MoD. Its first major product will be a National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment.
The National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment will examine the capability required to perform each task derived from the Coastal Command mission and identify the existing people, assets, and arrangements capable of contributing to it. For maritime surveillance, for example, this means mapping JMSC information systems, coastal radar, AIS, satellite feeds, fisheries VMS, UKSAR2G sensors, MCA King Air capability, UAS, port information and current surveillance procurements, and establishing how each will contribute to the MOP. For patrol and intervention, it means establishing the status, availability, and ownership of Border Force cutters, CPVs, and smaller craft, MMO and IFCA patrol capacity, devolved fisheries vessels, chartered ships, candidate Royal Navy Batch 1 River-class vessels, existing boarding personnel, and the force required to establish the MIG.
For every capability entering or supporting Coastal Command, the assessment will identify the statutory authority under which it operates, the department or administration owning the policy, the organisation providing the operational service, the budget, personnel and professional qualifications, asset ownership, lease or charter arrangements, commercial service contracts, engineering and maintenance, property and bases, communications, information systems and data ownership, training arrangements, current procurement programmes, and contractual or legal liabilities.
Each capability will then receive a defined transition route. Some people and assets will transfer directly. Some capabilities will pass first under Coastal Command operational control while administrative ownership transfers later. Commercial services will move through novation, change of government customer or contractual variation. All serviceable publicly funded fisheries-protection vessels, their crews, and relevant operational budgets will transfer to Coastal Command; fisheries policy, licensing, and regulation will remain with the competent authorities. Regulatory and scientific authorities will retain their specialist roles and task Coastal Command for operational delivery.
This first six months will also settle the initial Coastal Command command structure, rank architecture, Sector model, legal framework, commercial transition plan and financial baseline. By the end of that period, government will know precisely what capability it possesses, what operational effect that capability can generate, where the gaps lie, what can transfer immediately, what requires a contractual or legislative transition and what additional capability must be created.
The first major operational consolidation will take place during the following twelve months. The Home Office maritime law-enforcement capability will become the initial Coastal Command surface force. Its operational personnel, cutters, Coastal Patrol Vessels, appropriate small craft, technical support and budgets will transfer into the new service. Commercially chartered capability will enter the same tasking architecture for the duration of the relevant contracts.
JMSC will become the nucleus of the National Maritime Operations Centre. Existing surveillance and intelligence feeds will form the first Maritime Operating Picture. Interim Sector commands will be established through suitable existing sites, with the Channel receiving early priority because of the concentration of border, rescue and commercial-shipping activity there.
A nucleus Maritime Intervention Group will be formed during this period from selected and appropriately qualified personnel and will develop through established training relationships with Counter Terrorism Policing, specialist police firearms organisations, NCA, Royal Marines and other relevant specialist organisations.
The Maritime Capability Replacement Programme will transfer simultaneously, and its operational requirement will be reorientated to Coastal Command. The Government's current maritime ISR and Coastguard command-and-control programmes will be aligned with the same MOP and Sector architecture before further irreversible procurement decisions are taken.
The first objective is Initial Operating Capability at approximately 18 months. At that point, Coastal Command will possess statutory existence, national leadership, a functioning Maritime Operating Picture, direct operational command of the principal civil maritime law-enforcement capability, all six interim Sector chains of command, seven continuous at-sea surface patrol lines, the first three persistent 24/7 UAS lines, and the nucleus of the MIG, including its three dedicated medium intervention helicopters.
The next stage will extend the same command and information system across search and rescue, pollution response and fisheries enforcement. HM Coastguard rescue coordination and the Coastguard Rescue Service will transfer through their existing professional structures. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres will remain continuously operational while their organisational position, information systems, and tasking relationships become part of Coastal Command. Coastguard Rescue Officers will become the Coastal Command Rescue Officer Network and retain their distributed coastal and shore-based rescue role.
UKSAR2G will enter the same operational system. Coastal Command will become the government capability owner, establish aviation priorities and integrate aircraft tasking and information into the national maritime plan. Responsibility for contract management and budget will transfer at the commercial and accounting point established during the initial audit. Bristow aircraft and crews will continue to deliver the contracted service while Coastal Command develops the longer-term ownership and operating model.
Counter Pollution and Salvage operational capability will enter Coastal Command during the same broad period. Government pollution stocks, specialist response equipment, surveillance tasking and contracted response capability will come under Coastal Command operational management. The King Air aircraft presently associated with pollution surveillance will become Coastal Command maritime-surveillance aircraft carrying pollution-detection sensors as part of their general mission fit. Dedicated dispersant aircraft will remain a nationally held specialist capability. The National Contingency Plan will establish the command relationship between Coastal Command, SOSREP, environmental authorities, harbour authorities and commercial responders during major incidents.
Fisheries enforcement will be integrated with equal clarity. In England, the government will transfer the MMO's seagoing enforcement capability and the government customer role for its contracted offshore patrol capacity into Coastal Command during the first two years. Fisheries policy, licensing, quotas, conservation rules and technical regulation will remain with the competent fisheries authorities, which will define the enforcement requirement delivered at sea through Coastal Command.
The serviceable patrol craft, seagoing enforcement personnel and relevant operational budgets of the ten IFCAs will transfer to Coastal Command during the same period. Their at-sea enforcement activity will operate through the relevant Coastal Command Sectors, common communications and tasking arrangements. By the end of the third year, English public fisheries patrol activity at sea will cease to operate separately and will form part of the Coastal Command system.
During the same period, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish publicly funded fisheries-protection vessels, their crews and relevant operational budgets will transfer to Coastal Command on the same basis as the English. Regulatory and licensing responsibilities will, however, remain with the relevant devolved administrations.
By the end of the third year, all operational law-enforcement patrol, surveillance aviation, rescue coordination, pollution response and public fisheries patrol capability will have become the responsibility of Coastal Command, and all six Sectors will have continuous 24/7 UAS surveillance.
Concurrently to resource consolidation the Sector structure will be established.
Operating data gathered during the first years - shipping patterns, patrol demand, response times, rescue incidents, pollution risk, infrastructure activity, vessel availability, criminal routes, geography, weather and transit distances will assist in determining Sector boundaries, bases and force architecture, and allocations.
Each Sector will receive a Minimum Operational Availability Requirement, and those requirements will determine the permanent establishment of crews, vessels, aviation hours, boarding teams and specialist resources.
The same evidence will drive permanent basing: a vessel routinely spending several hours transiting between its berth and patrol area consumes fuel, crew endurance and usable operating time, so base selection will be judged by the operational hours and response times it can generate.
By approximately the fourth year, Coastal Command should reach Full Operating Capability.
At that point the national and Sector command system will be mature; the Maritime Operating Picture will operate continuously; patrol and surveillance, search and rescue, pollution response and fisheries enforcement will function through the common architecture; harbour reporting will operate nationally; training, engineering and logistics will sustain the force; the Maritime Intervention Group will provide a full nationally deployable specialist capability; and reinforcement between Sectors and wartime mobilisation arrangements will have been exercised. The planning establishment set out in Annex A is 5,000 paid personnel, supported by approximately 3,500 Coastal Command Rescue Officers, with 23 primary patrol vessels and 30 fast/inshore craft sustaining seven continuous surface patrol lines and three primary patrol vessels at short readiness for relief or reinforcement. Six continuous 24/7 UAS lines, based for planning purposes on approximately 40 S-100-class equivalent air vehicles, will operate alongside the existing 18-aircraft SAR helicopter network, six fixed-wing maritime-surveillance aircraft and three dedicated MIG intervention helicopters.
Full Operating Capability will complete the organisational transformation. Modernisation of major vessels, aviation and long-term contracted capability will continue through a longer programme aligned with asset life and contractual cycles.
Coastal Command will have its own uniformed rank structure, command hierarchy and professional qualification system.
Personnel transferring from Border Force Maritime, HM Coastguard, fisheries enforcement and other operational organisations currently serve under different grades, titles, professional qualifications and systems of authority. Coastal Command will replace those differences with one service structure.
The rank system will distinguish service rank, professional qualification and appointment. A vessel master, marine engineer, rescue controller, intelligence officer or specialist intervention operator will hold the professional qualification necessary for the role; Coastal Command rank will establish service seniority and command relationship; and the appointment held will define the authority attached to the post.
During the first year, a Coastal Command Personnel and Training Directorate will map every transferring operational grade, professional licence, and qualification against the new system. Personnel will enter the appropriate Coastal Command rank according to responsibility, experience and demonstrated competence. A formal conversion board will manage complex cases and ensure common standards across the service.
The rank structure will have a published Royal Navy equivalence schedule and may indeed mirror it. Equivalence will give both organisations clear command relationships during routine joint training and exercises and will become legally operative for designated personnel if Coastal Command is required to transfer under Royal Navy OPCON in time of war.
A new National Borders & Coastal Command Academy will own the standards underpinning the system. It will provide common institutional training for Borders & Coastal Command, Coastal Command entry and conversion training, rank and promotion courses, command training and the professional doctrine of the service.
Within Coastal Command, the Academy will provide or accredit qualification pathways for vessel command and deck operations, marine engineering, maritime law enforcement, boarding, search and rescue, operational command and control, surveillance, fisheries enforcement, pollution response, investigation and maritime special intervention.
Existing professional licences and recognised qualifications will be carried forward where they meet the new standard; conversion training will qualify personnel for clearly defined Coastal Command appointments and powers.
A transferred Border Force boarding officer, for example, will complete the additional law-enforcement, rescue, fisheries and common operating procedures required for the relevant Coastal Command patrol appointment. A fisheries enforcement officer entering a general-purpose patrol role will qualify in the common boarding, evidence, rescue and operational procedures required for that role. Coastguard rescue controllers will undertake training in use of the Coastal Command command-and-information system while retaining their specialist rescue coordination function.
The Maritime Intervention Group will operate a dedicated specialist selection and qualification system through the Academy, supported by training relationships with the Royal Marines, Counter Terrorism Policing, specialist police firearms organisations and other appropriate national specialist bodies.
The Academy will be established alongside, or in close proximity to, an appropriate Royal Navy training establishment. The relationship between Coastal Command and the Royal Navy will support shared maritime facilities, simulators, ranges and specialist instruction and will make Royal Navy interoperability a routine element of Coastal Command professional development.
Coastal Command will establish a single national engineering and logistics system to sustain the force and its operational availability.
The initial transfer will bring different vessel classes, maintenance contracts, engineering standards, spare-parts systems, aviation contracts and support arrangements into the service. Within the first year, a Coastal Command Engineering and Logistics Directorate will take responsibility for the readiness picture across the surface force, aviation, surveillance and nationally held specialist equipment.
The Directorate will maintain a single national maintenance plan showing the operational effect of planned refit, inspection and major maintenance periods. Sector commanders will therefore be able to see future reductions in local capability far enough in advance for replacement assets or revised tasking to be arranged. By Initial Operating Capability, directly controlled vessels and specialist resources will report readiness through one system; aviation and other capabilities will enter the same picture as their operational control and contract-management arrangements transfer.
The engineering organisation will establish common technical standards for new equipment. Secure communications, mission systems, protective equipment, boarding equipment, small craft and other routinely used systems will progressively converge through common procurement. The diversity of inherited vessels will reduce through the vessel-replacement programme as useful assets reach the end of their operational lives and common classes enter service.
The same principles will apply to aviation. Flying-hour planning, engineering support, spares, crew availability and base resilience will be managed against the combined surveillance and rescue requirement rather than separate departmental programmes.
A common logistics organisation will manage fuel, stores, specialist pollution equipment, operational reserves, medical supplies, protective equipment and the transport required to move national reinforcement capability between sectors. It will also maintain the stocks and transport arrangements required for surge, including major pollution incidents, mass rescue, sustained interdiction or national emergency.
The Sector basing study will form part of this logistics design. Bases will be selected according to patrol demand, response time, harbour access, all-weather availability, aviation support, engineering capacity, fuel, stores, accommodation, communications, security, resilience and expansion potential. Transit time will be treated as an operational cost and availability factor. The planning baseline in Annex A provides for 12-18 satellite operating stations or berths nationally and three principal engineering and logistics support hubs on the South Coast, in the Humber/North-East and in Scotland, using existing government, fisheries, Coastguard, Border Force and suitable port estate wherever practicable.
Coastal Command will inherit substantial capability that is presently delivered through commercial arrangements. Restore Britain will bring those capabilities into the Command in a way that preserves continuous service while progressively securing the degree of sovereign control required by the mission and the wartime role.
UKSAR2G is the most important example. In peacetime, Bristow-operated aircraft can continue to deliver search and rescue and wider aviation capability under contract while Coastal Command exercises the government tasking, capability-management and operational-integration responsibilities established for the service. The aircraft, sensors and information will operate as part of the Coastal Command aviation system even while ownership and day-to-day operation remain commercial.
The wartime requirement creates a further condition: every Coastal Command capability designated for mobilisation will have a legally assured route into Defence control. During the first six months, UKSAR2G and every other major contracted capability will therefore undergo a Defence Availability Review.
The Defence Availability Review review will identify the aircraft, sensors, engineering support, spares, bases, communications, data and personnel required by the wartime Coastal Command plan and establish the legal and contractual mechanism through which each becomes available to the Crown on mobilisation.
Where existing contracts provide the required rights of direction, those provisions will be incorporated into the mobilisation plan. Where additional rights are required, government will negotiate them at the earliest practicable contractual point and provide supporting statutory authority through the Borders & Coastal Command legislation where appropriate.
The enduring aviation model will ensure that aircraft designated for the wartime Coastal Command establishment can pass into Defence operations immediately on mobilisation.
Aircraft central to the wartime requirement may therefore move progressively towards Crown ownership. Aircrew and engineers required to operate those aircraft in war will carry the appropriate reserve or mobilisation liability, or Coastal Command will maintain a government cadre capable of assuming the operational role.
Commercial organisations may continue to provide engineering, maintenance and technical support under Defence direction where that remains effective, while wartime operational command, tasking and sortie generation sit within the Crown and military chain.
Successor aviation contracts will contain the wartime availability, government step-in, data, spares, infrastructure and personnel provisions required by this model from the date on which they are let. The same rule will apply to contracted patrol vessels, surveillance services and specialist pollution capability according to their place in the wartime force design.
Commercial transition will follow known contract dates. Break clauses, renewal points and expiry dates will be planned as capability decision points, allowing government to move each capability towards the ownership and operating model that produces the strongest combination of operational effectiveness, assured availability, resilience, sovereign control and whole-life value. This creates a deliberate progression towards a coherent national capability while avoiding unnecessary termination costs or breaks in essential rescue, surveillance or response services.
The present Maritime Capability Replacement Programme will become the foundation of a wider Coastal Command Vessel Capability Programme.
Existing design, technical and commercial work will be retained, while the requirement is rewritten around Coastal Command's missions, Sector environments, Minimum Operational Availability Requirements and wartime role.
Future vessel design will distinguish the operational effects required from offshore patrol, medium and coastal patrol, fast interception and boarding, afloat command and specialist or modular response. For each class the programme will specify endurance, sea state, speed, patrol duration, range, surveillance and communications fit, boarding and boat-handling arrangements, rescue capacity, safe capacity for rescued or detained persons, command facilities, crewing, engineering burden, availability, and whole-life cost.
Common hulls and systems will be used where they provide genuine operational advantage. A future patrol vessel should be able to conduct fisheries enforcement, border patrol, counter-smuggling, search-and-rescue support, infrastructure surveillance and other appropriate missions from the same platform. Mission modules, embarked specialists and additional equipment will provide the extra capability required for particular tasks.
Vessels designated for wartime mobilisation will be designed with that transition in mind. Secure communications, damage-control standards, deck and internal space, electrical power, data architecture and structural provision will permit the fitting of appropriate defensive systems, weapons, military communications or embarked personnel according to the wartime role assigned jointly with the Royal Navy.
The potential future of the Royal Navy's Batch 1 River-class Offshore Patrol Vessels Tyne, Mersey and Severn will be assessed within this force design. Their current Naval requirement, remaining hull life, operational availability, crewing, engineering and maintenance cost, civil conversion requirement and comparative whole-life value against purpose-built Coastal Command vessels will determine whether they remain in Naval service or contribute to Coastal Command as transitional or longer-term assets.
A Coastal Command Aviation Capability Review will establish the corresponding long-term aviation design. It will determine the required rotary-wing rescue capacity, fixed-wing maritime surveillance, uncrewed systems, specialist pollution response, command support, flying hours, basing, sensor fit, engineering, aircrew generation, availability, and resilience.
Coastal Command will be designed from inception as a peace and wartime maritime Arm.
In normal conditions Coastal Command will operate through the Home Office as the maritime operational arm of Borders & Coastal Command. Its daily mission will be border security, counter-smuggling, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response, sanctions enforcement, maritime infrastructure protection and the surveillance and policing of UK waters.
Where a serious maritime-security incident remains below the threshold of a military operation, Coastal Command will remain the lead and supported command.
A foreign-flagged vessel resisting lawful sanctions enforcement, a suspected hostile-state vessel interfering with subsea infrastructure, a major armed-smuggling operation or a terrorist threat at sea may require capabilities beyond those routinely held by a civilian maritime service. Coastal Command will retain its own Maritime Interdiction Groups for such tasks, but will also define the operational objective in case supporting national capabilities are required.
The lead will move when the Government determines that the situation has become a military operation or when the country enters war or a defined national-defence emergency. At that point the statutory mobilisation mechanism will transfer designated Coastal Command formations, vessels, aviation, the Maritime Intervention Group, surveillance capabilities, Sector facilities and personnel to the Ministry of Defence and place them under Royal Navy Operational Control (OPCON).
The transfer will include the administrative, disciplinary and logistical arrangements required to make military command effective. Designated Coastal Command personnel will assume the military or reserve status established in legislation. The rank-equivalence system will provide immediate clarity of command relationships. Communications and information systems will connect directly to Naval command. The Maritime Operating Picture will become a major contribution to the Royal Navy's Recognised Maritime Picture.
This wartime requirement will shape Coastal Command in peacetime. The Royal Navy will be able to draw upon a maritime organisation already deployed around the coastline and approaches, familiar with its waters, ports, shipping and critical infrastructure and already maintaining continuous surveillance. Its Sector headquarters will already work with harbour authorities and infrastructure operators. Its patrol vessels and aircraft will already form part of a national maritime picture. Its Maritime Intervention Group will already train for demanding armed maritime operations.
Under Royal Navy OPCON, Coastal Command will contribute to coastal surveillance and defence; protection of ports, naval bases and anchorages; protection of critical maritime infrastructure; monitoring and control of merchant shipping; maritime interdiction; search and rescue; local escort and force-protection tasks; movement and logistics support; and other missions suited to the capabilities of the force.
Selected Coastal Command platforms and personnel will possess a limited fighting capability appropriate to coastal security and low-level warfare in support of the Royal Navy.
The wartime fit of individual vessel classes will be developed jointly with the Ministry of Defence and may include defensive armament, additional communications, embarked military personnel and other mission equipment. Coastal Command will thereby provide useful armed maritime capacity below the peer-on-peer warfighting level for which the Royal Navy remains organised and equipped. Likewise, Coastal Command will be in a position to meet more demanding below-war threshold border security and management tasks without having to call on scarce military assets The Maritime Intervention Group (MIG) will provide an especially important bridge across peace, crisis and war. In peacetime it will deliver armed specialist boarding parties, maritime law enforcement and counter-terrorism capabilities. During a national-security crisis it can lead or participate in complex intervention with Royal Navy, RAF, police and intelligence support. On mobilisation its designated elements will pass under Naval OPCON and contribute to maritime interdiction, force protection, port security and protection of critical infrastructure alongside Royal Marines and other military units.
The command relationship will be trained and rehearsed, rather than improvised.
Coastal Command and Royal Navy headquarters will rehearse the transfer of OPCON. Sector commanders will exercise with their Naval counterparts. Mobilisation procedures will be tested. Planning processes will be common Coastal Command will adopt joint operations planning practices - Vessel and aviation crews carrying wartime liabilities will undertake relevant joint training.
The Academy will ensure that personnel understand both their civil duties and the defence role for which they may be mobilised.
The national equivalent of Coastal Command in many other countries fills a similar wartime role as this policy lays out. There is also a British precedent.
The Coastguard Act 1925 provided for His Majesty's Coastguard to pass under Admiralty control in an emergency.
The contemporary United States Coast Guard demonstrates the continuing utility of a maritime service that operates in a civil security role in normal conditions and as a military arm in the Navy when war or Presidential direction requires it.
Coastal Command will adapt that institutional logic to modern British requirements.
The financial programme will distinguish clearly between expenditure the State already commits to the maritime capabilities being brought into Coastal Command, the temporary cost of transition and the additional investment required to close identified capability gaps.
Existing government expenditure supports Home Office maritime law enforcement and vessel replacement, JMSC, HM Coastguard rescue coordination and the Coastguard Rescue Service, UKSAR2G, counter-pollution capabilities; fisheries enforcement; maritime surveillance; vessel maintenance; information systems; bases and supporting contracts. As those resources and programmes transfer to Coastal Command, so will the funding associated with them.
Transition expenditure will cover the Programme Directorate, legislation, commercial transfer and contract variation, information-system integration, workforce conversion, temporary parallel arrangements during technical migration, Sector development, the establishment of the Maritime Intervention Group and the creation of the Academy, engineering and logistics systems. Capability investment will then address the deficiencies revealed by the National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment and by operational experience after the Command begins to function as one system.
On the planning assumptions set out in Annex A, additional establishment expenditure is estimated at £1.50 billion to Initial Operating Capability at eighteen months and £3.70 billion to Full Operating Capability at approximately forty-eight months. The gross annual running cost at FOC is estimated at £1.41 billion at 2026 prices. Of that, £0.4-£0.5 billion is expected to transfer from existing expenditure, leaving a net additional annual requirement of approximately £0.91-£1.01 billion, subject to confirmation by the first six-month National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment and audit.
This approach will allow ministers and Parliament to see three figures clearly: what the state already spends on the maritime responsibilities being consolidated, what Coastal Command costs in total once those budgets have transferred, and what additional expenditure is required to achieve the desired level of operational effect.
Planning baseline for transition to Initial Operating Capability and Full Operating Capability
This Annex sets out a costed planning force structure for Coastal Command. It shows the scale of organisation required by the policy. The National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment undertaken during the first six months of government will confirm or amend the figures. All costs are central planning estimates at 2026 prices.
Six Sector Commands: Channel; Southern North Sea; Northern North Sea; Western Approaches; Irish Sea; North Atlantic.
Requirement for seven continuous, at sea, surface patrol vessels: two in the Channel and one in each of the other five Sectors.
At FOC, at least three additional primary patrol vessels will be held at short readiness for relief and reinforcement, in addition to the seven vessels continuously at sea.
Requirement for continuous 24/7 uncrewed-aircraft surveillance in each Sector at FOC.
Immediate rotary-wing search-and-rescue readiness through the existing national SAR network, integrated into Coastal Command.
A national fixed-wing maritime-surveillance force capable of supporting any Sector
One National Maritime Operations Centre maintaining the Maritime Operating Picture, with six Sector HQs and retained subordinate rescue/operating nodes.
A national Maritime Intervention Group (MIG) with three dedicated rotary-wing intervention aircraft and specialist surface vessel transport, able to conduct armed high-risk maritime intervention and vessel seizures.
One National Borders & Coastal Command Academy, a single rank and qualification system, and a national engineering and logistics organisation.
All serviceable publicly funded fisheries-protection vessels and relevant operational personnel transfer to Coastal Command.
Fisheries, environmental and other specialist policy and regulation ownership remains with the competent authority
At-sea fisheries protection is a Coastal Command task.
The long-term common vessel replacement programme, any future Crown-owned replacement for UKSAR2G aviation, and major wartime weapons programmes are excluded from this Annex. The three dedicated MIG intervention helicopters required for IOC and FOC are included. The Annex includes transfer, life-extension, standardisation, integration and shortfall-filling needed to reach IOC and FOC.
Initial Coastal Command capacity will be assembled from capabilities already provided by public funds. The first six-month National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment and audit will establish the exact condition, ownership, contractual status and transferable manpower of each element. The planning baseline is as follows.
| Element | Current planning baseline | Treatment on formation |
|---|---|---|
| Paid maritime personnel | c.1,500 | Border Force Maritime;HM Coastguard operational staff; JMSC; fisheries protection and enforcement; relevant technical/support staff. Exact transferable headcount to be confirmed by audit. |
| Home Office surface force | 5 cutters nominally (4 usable planning baseline following disposal of HMC Protector); 6 Coastal Patrol Vessels; RHIBs and Tactical Water Craft | Transfer as the initial national law-enforcement surface force; retain chartered capacity where necessary during transition. |
| Scottish fisheries protection vessels | Minna, Jura, Hirta; 2 high-speed inshore craft | Transfer serviceable vessels, crews and relevant budgets to Coastal Command. |
| Welsh fisheries protection vessels | Rhodri Morgan, Lady Megan, Catrin, Gwenllian, Siwan | Transfer serviceable vessels, crews and relevant budgets to Coastal Command. |
| Northern Ireland fisheries protection | Banrion Uladh plus fast-response/inshore craft | Transfer serviceable vessels, crews and relevant budgets to Coastal Command. |
| English fisheries protection | MMO contracted offshore patrol capacity; IFCA patrol craft and seagoing enforcement personnel | Bring offshore patrol capacity and serviceable public patrol craft into Coastal Command; exact IFCA fleet to be confirmed by audit. |
| Rotary-wing SAR | 18 helicopters | Existing UKSAR2G service from 10 permanent and 2 seasonal bases; integrate tasking, MOP and wartime availability. |
| Fixed-wing aviation | 6 King Air aircraft | Existing UKSAR2G fleet at Humberside, Newquay and Prestwick; operate as Coastal Command maritime-surveillance aircraft. |
| Uncrewed aviation | 1 mobile S-100 system | Starting point only; major expansion required to sustain six 24/7 Sector lines at FOC. |
| National command and rescue estate | JMSC/JRCC; MRCC network | Use as the nucleus of the NMOC, six Sector HQs and retained local rescue/operating nodes. |
| Pollution response | Existing counter-pollution stocks, specialist equipment and contracted aviation | Transfer operational management into Coastal Command; specialist environmental/regulatory authority remains elsewhere. |
Initial Operating Capability is planned for approximately 18 months after taking office. Coastal Command must by then be a functioning operational command, not a paper headquarters. The first 18 months are divided into two stages.
| Phase | Timing | Operational position reached | Establishment spend |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 - Establish and design | 0-6 months | Programme Directorate and SRO; National Maritime Border and Capability Assessment; legislation; rank structure; asset and contract audit; NMOC/MOP design; interim Sector command design; recruitment starts. | £250m |
| Phase 2 - Initial Operating Capability | 6-18 months | Home Office maritime force transfers; JMSC/JRCC form NMOC core; all six interim Sector HQs operating; seven surface patrol lines sustained using transferred/chartered vessels; first three persistent UAS lines; MIG at initial readiness with three dedicated intervention helicopters; Academy Phase 1. | £1.25bn |
Establishment expenditure to IOC: £1.50 billion.
At IOC the organisation will have national command, all six Sector chains of command, a working Maritime Operating Picture, seven continuous surface patrol lines, immediate rotary-wing SAR through the existing network, fixed-wing surveillance, three persistent UAS lines, the nucleus of the Maritime Intervention Group and the first stage of the Academy and engineering/logistics system.
| Element | IOC planning establishment | IOC position |
|---|---|---|
| Paid personnel | c.3,200 FTE | About 1,500 transferred; balance recruited or converted during the first 18 months. |
| National Maritime Operations Centre | 1 | JMSC/JRCC operational, with MOP active and maintained, and national tasking mechanisms operational. |
| Sector HQs | 6 interim HQs | All six Sector HQs operating from existing Coastguard/government estate. |
| Continuous, at sea, surface patrol presence | 7 vessels | Two in the Channel; one in each of the other Sectors, utilising transferred capacity, and chartered capacity where required. |
| Primary patrol vessels | c.18-20 in readiness pool | Transferred vessels selected by condition and availability; refit incl. common military compatible C2 under way. |
| Fast/inshore/interception craft | c.20-24 | Transferred serviceable craft plus first shortfall purchases. |
| Rotary-wing SAR | 18 helicopters | Existing UKSAR2G network integrated operationally into the MOP and Coastal Command Command & control. |
| Fixed-wing surveillance | 6 King Air aircraft | Common national tasking through Coastal Command and networked into the MOP |
| Persistent UAS | c.20 air vehicles; 3 simultaneous 24/7 UAS lines | 50% of the six-Sector persistent UAS requirement, with sufficient training, maintenance and reserve aircraft to sustain three continuous lines. |
| Maritime Intervention Group | Initial readiness | Nucleus formed, armed and deployable; three dedicated rotary-wing intervention aircraft available. Full 200-person establishment follows with FOC. |
| Academy | Phase 1 | Entry/conversion training, rank and qualification transition under way. |
| Engineering/logistics | Initial national system | Readiness reporting and national maintenance planning in place for directly controlled assets. |
The period from 18 to 48 months completes the transfer of the remaining maritime capabilities, expands persistent surveillance to all six Sectors, establishes the permanent estate and builds the manpower, training, engineering and logistics depth required to sustain the force.
| Phase | Timing | Operational position reached | Establishment spend |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 3 - National integration | 18-36 months | SAR, pollution and fisheries operational capability fully transferred/integrated; all six 24/7 UAS lines operating; permanent Sector facilities and satellite operating locations; MIG reaches full establishment; engineering/logistics system operational through three principal support hubs. | £1.45bn |
| Phase 4 - Full Operating Capability | 36-48 months | 5,000 paid establishment; 23 primary patrol vessels and 30 fast/inshore craft in the readiness system; three primary patrol vessels at short readiness for relief/reinforcement; six persistent UAS lines; national MOP and Sector system fully resilient; Academy, logistics, harbour reporting and mobilisation arrangements exercised. | £750m |
Additional establishment expenditure from IOC to FOC: £2.20 billion. Total establishment expenditure to FOC: £3.70 billion.
Full Operating Capability is planned for approximately 48 months from transition initiation date.
FOC is reached when Coastal Command can sustain the required operational presence and readiness, rather than merely own the assets.
| Element | FOC planning establishment | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Paid personnel | 5,000 FTE | About 1,500 transferred from existing maritime organisations; about 3,500 additional posts. |
| Coastguard Rescue Officers | c.3,500 | Transferred into the Coastal Command Rescue Officer Network; separate from the 5,000 core FTE establishment. |
| National Maritime Operations Centre | 1 | Fareham/Portsmouth area, built from JRCC/JMSC capability and estate. |
| Sector HQs | 6 | Dover; Humber/Bridlington; Aberdeen; Falmouth; Holyhead; Stornoway. Existing Coastguard estate used wherever practicable. |
| Sector satellite operating locations | 12-18 | Forward berths/operating stations based principally on existing Coastguard, fisheries, Border Force and suitable port estate. |
| Primary patrol vessels | 23 | 11 offshore/long-endurance and 12 coastal/general patrol vessels. Two of the 23 fitted for afloat command. |
| Fast/inshore patrol and interception craft | 30 | Sector rapid-response, inshore, boarding and shallow-water capability. |
| Embarked/shore boarding RHIBs | 24 | In addition to fast patrol craft; carried by larger vessels or held at Sector bases. |
| Continuous surface patrol lines | 7 | Two Channel; one in every other Sector. |
| Ready reinforcement/relief | 3 primary vessels at short readiness | Two national reserve hulls plus one rotating Sector vessel held at short readiness for relief or reinforcement. |
| Rotary-wing SAR aircraft | 18 | Existing UKSAR2G national helicopter establishment: 10 permanent bases plus 2 seasonal bases. |
| MIG rotary-wing intervention aircraft | 3 | Dedicated medium rotary-wing aircraft for high-risk maritime intervention and rapid national deployment. |
| Fixed-wing maritime-surveillance aircraft | 6 | Existing UKSAR2G King Air fleet at Humberside, Newquay and Prestwick. |
| UAS air vehicles | c.40 S-100-class equivalents | Six 24/7 Sector lines, plus training, maintenance and national reserve. Final number depends upon selected platform endurance and availability. |
| Maritime Intervention Group | 200 personnel | National armed specialist maritime intervention capability. |
| Academy | 1 national establishment | Common entry, rank, professional and specialist training; close RN training relationship. |
| Engineering/logistics | 1 national system | Three principal support hubs plus Sector workshops and stores. |
The present planning establishment is 5,000 paid personnel at FOC. The figure is deliberately larger than the present maritime workforce because one of the changes this policy introduces is the requirement for around-the-clock command, continuous at sea patrols, persistent surveillance and armed intervention capability, together with supporting, training, engineering and logistics depth.
The existing paid maritime elements to be consolidated are estimated at about 1,500 personnel; the first six-month audit will establish the exact transferable headcount. Approximately 3,500 additional paid posts are therefore required to reach the present FOC planning establishment.
| Area | FTE | Personnel resources to be transferred to Coastal Command at formation |
|---|---|---|
| Coastal Command HQ, NMOC, national intelligence and operations | 375 | JMSC; Border Security Command/Coastal Command staff; HM Coastguard national operations; new recruitment. |
| Six Sector HQs and 24/7 watchkeeping | 780 | HM Coastguard MRCC staff; Border Force maritime command staff; fisheries operational staff; new recruitment. |
| Surface vessel crews, boarding teams and small-craft operators | 1,350 | Border Force Maritime; fisheries protection vessel crews; MMO/IFCA seagoing staff; new maritime constables and seafarers. |
| Aviation and UAS operations, planning and technical support | 500 | HM Coastguard aviation capability management; transferred specialist staff; new UAS operators, engineers and mission staff; dedicated MIG rotary-wing aircrew and technical support. |
| SAR coordination and paid coastal operations staff | 520 | HM Coastguard operational staff. Coastguard Rescue Officers remain additional to this figure. |
| Maritime Intervention Group | 200 | Selected Coastal Command personnel and direct specialist recruitment. |
| Engineering, logistics and estate | 500 | Border Force technical staff; fisheries vessel engineers; MCA support staff; new recruitment. |
| Academy and training | 175 | Transferred instructors plus new training staff. |
| Investigation, evidence, harbour compliance and specialist liaison | 275 | Border Force, fisheries enforcement, HM Coastguard and new constabulary/investigation posts. |
| Finance, HR, commercial, legal, procurement and IT | 325 | Transferred support posts plus new programme and service support. |
| TOTAL | 5,000 | Planning establishment. |
The FOC requirement is 23 primary patrol vessels. This is a force-availability figure, not a proposal to buy 23 new ships.
Coastal Command will inherit a large mixed force. The first task is to select the serviceable vessels that best meet the offshore, coastal and inshore requirements, refit them where economical, and use chartered capacity only where necessary to sustain availability.
The later Common-Vessel Replacement Programme is excluded from this Annex.
| FOC element | Number | Initial source | FOC action |
|---|---|---|---|
| Offshore/long-endurance patrol vessels | 11 | Four usable Home Office cutters; Scottish MPVs Jura, Hirta and Minna; larger transferred fisheries vessels; chartered capacity where necessary. | Select by condition/endurance; refit; fit common C2/MOP systems. Jura/Hirta or equivalent to be assessed for afloat-command conversion. |
| Coastal/general patrol vessels | 12 | Six Border Force CPVs; larger English/Welsh/NI fisheries patrol vessels; suitable IFCA vessels. | Transfer, classify by capability, life-extend where economical, standardise with Military compatible communications and boarding fit. |
| Fast/inshore/interception craft | 30 | Border Force RHIB/Tactical Water Craft; Scottish/Welsh/NI inshore craft; IFCA patrol RHIBs and cabin craft. | Retain serviceable craft; buy only the shortfall needed to reach Sector allocations. |
| Boarding RHIBs | 24 | Embarked Border Force/fisheries craft plus new common boats. | Standardise boarding layout, comms, navigation and evidence fit. |
| Afloat command capability | 2 within the 23 primary hulls | Conversion of two suitable larger transferred vessels. | Install secure communications,MOP displays, planning and multi-unit operations command & control spaces, and accommodation for multi-agency command and specialist teams. |
At FOC the surface fleet will be allocated to Sectors as follows.
Each Sector's vessel will be identified collectively as a 'squadron'
| Sector | Primary patrol vessels | Fast/inshore craft | Continuous surface presence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Channel & Eastern Approaches | 6 | 6 | 2 patrol vessels |
| Southern North Sea | 3 | 4 | 1 patrol vessel |
| Northern North Sea | 3 | 4 | 1 patrol vessel |
| Western Approaches | 3 | 4 | 1 patrol vessel |
| Irish Sea | 3 | 4 | 1 patrol vessel |
| North Atlantic | 3 | 4 | 1 patrol vessel |
| National reserve | 2 | 4 additional fast craft within total of 30 | Two national reinforcement hulls; a further rotating Sector vessel held at short readiness. |
| Capability | FOC establishment | Source | Establishment action |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rotary-wing SAR | 18 helicopters | UKSAR2G contract. Ten permanent helicopter bases and two seasonal bases. | Transfer government capability ownership/tasking into Coastal Command; integrate communications, MOP and wartime availability. No new helicopter purchase assumed. |
| MIG rotary-wing intervention | 3 medium helicopters | No existing dedicated Coastal Command capability; initially procured or leased as required to meet IOC. | Provide organic high-readiness lift for the MIG, including night maritime operations, specialist communications and national deployment. |
| Fixed-wing maritime surveillance | 6 King Air aircraft | UKSAR2G fixed-wing fleet at Humberside, Newquay and Prestwick. | Operate as Coastal Command surveillance aircraft; common tasking across surveillance, SAR support, pollution detection and national-security missions. |
| Persistent UAS | c.40 S-100-class equivalent air vehicles; 6 simultaneous 24/7 lines | One existing UKSAR2G mobile S-100 system provides a starting point. | Acquire/contract the additional systems, ground stations, sensors, data links, spares and training/reserve fleet required for six permanent lines. Final aircraft number will depend on the endurance of the selected platform. |
| Specialist pollution aviation | As required by national contingency plan | Existing contracted aerial dispersant/specialist response capability. | Retain as nationally held specialist capability within Coastal Command. |
UAS planning rule. One aircraft permanently airborne in each Sector requires substantially more than six air vehicles. On the present S-100-class planning assumption, the establishment is approximately six aircraft per Sector, giving 36 aircraft, plus four national training, maintenance and attrition-reserve aircraft: c.40 in total.
Final UAS numbers will depend upon the endurance, maintenance burden, weather limits and availability of the selected platform. A materially longer-endurance aircraft could reduce the number required.
| Command | Planning location | Existing estate used | FOC role |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Maritime Operations Centre (NMOC) | Fareham/Portsmouth area | JRCC/JMSC and associated secure government maritime estate. | National MOP; national planning, tasking and joint operations; intelligence; cross-Sector operations; Defence/NCA/HMRC/CT interface. |
| Channel and Eastern Approaches Sector HQ | Dover | Dover MRCC, Langdon Battery/Swi ngate estate. | Channel command, small-boats/security tasking, Dover Strait traffic, SAR and port liaison. |
| Southern North Sea Sector HQ | Humber/Bridl ington | Humber MRCC and associated east-coast government estate. | Southern North Sea, major ports, fisheries, offshore energy and infrastructure. |
| Northern North Sea Sector HQ | Aberdeen | Aberdeen MRCC, Marine House. | Northern North Sea, offshore energy, fisheries and infrastructure. |
| Western Approaches Sector HQ | Falmouth | Falmouth MRCC, Pendennis Point. | Western Approaches, long-range patrol, SAR and Atlantic traffic. |
| Irish Sea Sector HQ | Holyhead | Holyhead MRCC. Belfast and Milford Haven retained as rescue/operating nodes. | Irish Sea patrol, ports, ferries, fisheries and energy. |
| North Atlantic Sector HQ | Stornoway | Stornoway MRCC. Shetland retained as rescue/operating node. | Hebrides, northern approaches, Atlantic patrol and reinforcement. |
| Sector satellite operating stations / berths | 12-18 nationally | Existing Coastguard, fisheries, Border Force and suitable port/harbour estate. | Forward basing of fast/inshore craft, boarding teams, fuel, stores and local response capability within each Sector. |
| Academy | South Coast; Portsmouth/Fareham area preferred | New/refurbished government estate close to RN training facilities. | Common training, command courses, boarding, firearms, simulation and RN joint training and interoperability. |
| Engineering/logistics hubs | South Coast; Humber/North-East; Scotland | Existing maritime bases supplemented by new workshops/ stores or contracted heavy-support facilities where appropriate. | Second-line engineering, national spares, deployable support, northern heavy support and surge stocks. |
| MIG national base | South Coast | Dedicated secure site within the wider Coastal Command/ RN training and support area. | High-readiness armed intervention, training and national deployment. |
Existing MRCCs not selected as Sector HQs remain operational rescue and local coordination nodes unless the capability assessment identifies a better arrangement. Sector satellite operating stations and berths will be drawn principally from existing government, fisheries, Coastguard, Border Force and suitable port estate. Existing government estate is to be used wherever it meets the operational requirement; major new-build bases are excluded from this costing.
| Capability | FOC establishment | Planning cost to establish | Annual running cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maritime Operating Picture /NMOCC2 | National system operational with resilient backup, Sector and deployed asset feeds | £350m | £70m |
| Maritime Intervention Group (MIG) | 200 personnel; armed high-readiness capability | £100m | £25m plus personnel costs |
| MIG rotary-wing aviation | 3 medium intervention helicopters | £140m | £35m plus personnel costs |
| Academy | National academy; 160 permanent staff | £150m | £35m |
| Engineering/logistics system | 3 principal hubs + Sector workshops/stores | £350m | £75m centrally, plus vessel/aviation maintenance budgets |
| Port and harbour movement reporting | National digital reporting and compliance system | £60m | £15m |
| Defence interoperability/mobilisation | RN-compatible comms, exercises, legal and mobilisation arrangements | £70m | £15m |
The central planning figure to transition from start, through IOC, to FOC, is £3.7 billion over four years. This figure is additional to existing budgets and to future major replacement programmes. It pays for creation of the organisation, integrating inherited capabilities, assets and resources, filling immediate shortfalls, establishing persistent UAS coverage, providing dedicated MIG rotary-wing lift, building the command, control, operational planning and support systems, and recruiting/training the additional required establishment.
| Cost area | £m | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| Surface fleet transfer, refit and standardisation | 550 | Technical surveys; life extension/refit of selected inherited vessels; common communications/sensors; two command conversions; fast craft/RHIB gap fill; additional shortfall and readiness-reserve provision to support 23 primary hulls. |
| Persistent UAS establishment | 400 | c.40 S-100-class equivalent UAS, six Sector systems, ground stations, sensors, data links, spares, training and national reserve. |
| Aviation integration and mobilisation | 70 | Common tasking/MOP integration; secure communications; wartime availability arrangements; no new SAR helicopter fleet. |
| MIG rotary-wing intervention capability | 140 | Three medium intervention helicopters, initial mission equipment, secure communications, training and support package; purchase or lease structure to be determined at IOC. |
| NMOC, MOP, secure C2 and cyber | 350 | National operations centre, data fusion, system integration, secure networks, resilience and Sector interfaces. |
| Six Sector HQ estates | 250 | Refurbishment/adaptation of existing estates, secure C2 and local operating facilities, including 12-18 satellite operating locations/berths. |
| Academy | 150 | Site, classrooms, simulators, maritime training facilities, boarding/firearms training and equipment. Co-location or location in proximity to MoD training facilities can reduce costs through shared use and joint training. |
| Maritime Intervention Group (MIG) | 100 | Secure base, specialist equipment, weapons, boats, communications, medical and initial training. |
| Engineering and logistics | 350 | Three national support hubs, Sector workshops, stores, initial spares, maintenance-management and deployable support. |
| Personnel establishment and conversion | 300 | Recruitment, initial training, rank/qualification conversion, uniforms, vetting and workforce transition to the 5,000 paid FOC establishment. |
| Harbour reporting | 60 | National system, port interfaces, small-harbour reporting and compliance tools. |
| Programme, legal and commercial transition | 120 | Programme Directorate, legislation, transfer of budgets/contracts, commercial and financial work. |
| Defence interoperability and mobilisation | 70 | RN interfaces, mobilisation systems, joint planning/exercises and initial military-compatible fit. |
| Strategic spares and resilience | 300 | Initial operating reserve, equipment stocks, redundancy and surge capacity. |
| Contingency | 490 | Approx. 15% allowance for estate, contract, technical and integration risk. |
| TOTAL | 3,700 | Central planning figure; working range £3.2bn-£4.2bn. |
The gross annual running cost is estimated at £1.41 billion at 2026 prices. This is the cost of the whole Coastal Command establishment. A substantial part is existing expenditure that transfers with the capability; it is not all new spending.
| Annual cost | £m/year | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Paid personnel - 5,000 FTE | 410 | Average at full establishment = appx £82,000 per FTE, including pension, NI, allowances and employer costs. |
| Coastguard Rescue Officer network (transferred into the Command and becoming the Coastal Command Rescue Officer Network) | 20 | Planning allowance for remuneration/allowances, equipment, training and support for c.3,500 CROs; exact transferred baseline and future remuneration model to be confirmed by audit. |
| Rotary/fixed-wing SAR and surveillance aviation | 200 | Broadly in line with the existing MCA UK SAR helicopter, aerial-surveillance and spraying budget; transferred baseline expenditure. |
| MIG rotary-wing intervention aviation | 35 | Flying programme, aircrew/technical support not already included in personnel, maintenance, mission equipment and high-readiness availability for three dedicated helicopters. |
| Requirement for six x continuous UAS | 125 | Flying programme, operators, engineering, sensors, spares, data links and attrition for c.40 S-100-class equivalent air vehicles sustaining six 24/7 lines. |
| Surface vessels and small craft | 175 | Fuel, planned maintenance, docking, consumables, charters and vessel-specific support for 23 primary hulls and 30 fast/inshore craft. |
| MOP, ISR data, secure networks and cyber | 70 | Sensor/data services, satellite/commercial data, software, network support and cyber resilience. |
| NMOC and Sector HQ estate/operations | 75 | Buildings, utilities, secure systems, 12-18 satellite operating locations and non-pay operating costs. |
| National engineering/logistics | 75 | Three principal support hubs, spares system, deployable engineering and national stores not already charged directly to vessel/aviation budgets. |
| Academy and training | 35 | Training delivery, simulators, ranges, courses and continuation training. |
| MIG specialist non-personnel costs | 25 | Weapons, ammunition, specialist boats/equipment, exercises, tactical medical and high-readiness support. |
| Harbour reporting system | 15 | Hosting, maintenance, port interfaces, compliance and support. |
| Corporate/commercial/legal/IT support | 35 | Service-level central support not included elsewhere. |
| Joint exercises and wartime readiness | 15 | RN/RAF interoperability, mobilisation exercises and specialist joint training. |
| Pollution specialist stocks and response | 10 | Stock maintenance/replenishment and specialist non-aviation response. |
| Operational reserve | 90 | Surge, defects, emergency charter, exceptional deployment, additional ready surface reinforcement and cost uncertainty. |
| TOTAL GROSS | 1,410 | Rounded policy figure: £1.41bn per year. |
The £1.41 billion annual figure is not all new spending. UKSAR2G, Border Force Maritime, HM Coastguard operational command, fisheries-protection vessels and crews, JMSC, counter-pollution capability and existing maritime surveillance already consume substantial public funds. Those budgets transfer with the capability.
| Planning figure | Amount | Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Gross Coastal Command annual running cost at FOC | £1.41bn | Whole-service cost. |
| Existing expenditure expected to transfer | £0.40bn-£0.50bn | Working estimate pending audit. |
| Net additional annual funding at FOC | £0.91bn-£1.01bn | Additional resources needed for greater manning, persistent UAS, 23-hull surface readiness, MIG rotary-wing lift, Sector command, Academy and support depth. |
| One-off establishment to IOC | £1.50bn | Additional expenditure over the first 18 months. |
| Further establishment from IOC to FOC | £2.20bn | Additional expenditure over months 18-48. |
| One-off establishment to FOC | £3.70bn | Additional expenditure over four years. |
Home Office / Border Force Maritime Capability Replacement Programme: current planning baseline of five cutters and six Coastal Patrol Vessels; for this Annex four cutters are treated as the usable transfer baseline following disposal of HMC Protector; current programme intended to replace the fleet and supporting infrastructure.
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, An inspection of General Maritime (published October 2025): Border Force Maritime Command had 279 staff in post against 339 authorised FTE; ageing cutter and CPV force; availability constrained by maintenance and life-extension work.
HM Coastguard UKSAR2G material, December 2025 and 2026 updates: 18 helicopters, six King Air fixed-wing aircraft, one mobile UAS system; ten permanent helicopter bases, two seasonal bases, and fixed-wing bases at Humberside, Newquay and Prestwick.
Royal Navy Peregrine/S-100 operating material: S-100-class aircraft provide sorties of approximately five hours; the c.40-aircraft planning figure is therefore an endurance-based equivalent for six continuous 24/7 Sector lines and will change if a longer-endurance platform is selected.
MCA Business Plan 2025-26: £198m planned expenditure on UK SAR helicopter, aerial-surveillance and spraying services; £75.1m payroll; £17.4m accommodation.
HM Coastguard rescue-centre information, updated July 2026: MRCCs at Aberdeen, Shetland, Stornoway, Milford Haven, Holyhead, Belfast, Humber, Falmouth and Dover, with JRCC at Fareham.
Scottish Government Marine Directorate: MPVs Minna, Jura and Hirta plus two high-speed inshore craft.
Welsh Government fisheries patrol-vessel information: Rhodri Morgan, Lady Megan and associated smaller craft.
DAERA fisheries enforcement material: Banrion Uladh and fast-response craft.
IFCA 2025-26/2026-27 vessel and annual-plan material, including Cornwall Saint Piran, North Eastern Guardian IV, Eastern Protector IV and associated craft, Sussex Watchful/Merlin/Osprey, Southern IFCA craft and other inshore assets.
HM Coastguard Coastguard Rescue Service material: approximately 3,500 Coastguard Rescue Officers in a national network of more than 300 teams. The future remuneration model and exact transferred annual cost are to be confirmed during the first six-month audit.
The numbers in this Annex are deliberately sufficient to deliver the policy as written. They are not a claim that the final force must contain exactly these assets. The first six months of government will test the assumptions against condition surveys, operational availability, geography, staffing, contracts and cost.
1. See Rupert Lowe & Harrison Pitt, Mass Deportations: Legitimacy, Legality, Logistics, Restore Britain (2025). ↩
2. See Rupert Lowe & Henry Bolton, Impartial Service to the Law: Restoring British Policing, Restore Britain (2026). ↩